तीस रुपये रिश्वत, एक वर्ष की कैद, सौ रुपये जुर्माना… 40 वर्ष की बर्खास्तगी
इलाहाबाद हाईकोर्ट ने तीस रुपये की रिश्वत, एक वर्ष की कैद और सौ रुपये जुर्माना की सजा पाने के बाद सेवा से 40 वर्ष बर्खास्त रहे ट्यूबवेल ऑपरेटर के सेवानिवृत्ति परिलाभ के दावे को खारिज कर दिया।
न्यायमूर्ति जेजे मुनीर की एकल पीठ ने बरेली के सिंचाई विभाग में तैनात रहे ट्यूबवेल ऑपरेटर नेतराम की याचिका पर उक्त फैसला सुनाया। कहा, सेवाकाल के दौरान अपराध से बरी होने पर ही कर्मचारी सेवानिवृत्ति परिलाभ पाने का हकदार हो सकता है। मौजूदा मामले में याची सेवानिवृत्ति की आयु पूरी कर चुका है।
ऐसे में अब उसे सेवा में बहाल नहीं किया जा सकता। इसके अलावा उसकी सेवा अस्थाई प्रकृति की थी, इसलिए वह कोई भी राहत पाने का हकदार नहीं हैं। लिहाजा उसकी याचिका बेदम है और खारिज की जाती है।
बरी होने पर सेवानिवृत्ति परिलाभ के लिए पहुंचे थे हाईकोर्ट
प्रस्तुत मामले में याची की नियुक्ति सिंचाई विभाग, बरेली के अधिशासी अभियंता ने 17 अगस्त 77 को ट्यूबवेल ऑपरेटर के पद पर की थी। फतेहगंज वेस्ट में तैनाती के दौरान पूरनलाल यदुवंशी से उनकी फसल सिंचाई में न दर्ज करने के लिए 15 दिसंबर 78 को तीस रुपये की रिश्वत लिए जाने के आरोप में उसके खिलाफ एफआईआर दर्ज हुई। अदालत ने ट्रायल में उसे एक वर्ष की कैद और सौ रुपये जुर्माने की सजा सुनाई थी। बरेली की जिला अदालत के फैसले के बाद उसे 28 दिसंबर 83 को सेवा से बर्खास्त कर दिया गया। हालांकि, सजा के खिलाफ दाखिल अपील एक फरवरी 2023 को मंजूर हो गई और वह बरी हो गया, लेकिन इस बीच उसने वर्ष 2016 में सेवानिवृत्ति की आयु पूरी कर ली। 40 वर्ष सेवा से बर्खास्त रहे नेतराम ने सेवानिवृत्ति परिलाभों के लिए हाईकोर्ट का दरवाजा खटखटाया था।
याची के वकील की दलील
■ याची के वकील का कहना था कि याची पर लगाए गए आरोप गलत साबित हुए। झूठे आपराधिक मुकदमे के निस्तारण में देरी न हुई होती तो याची सेवाकाल में ही बहाल हो जाता और उसे सेवा संबंधी सभी लाभ मिलते। याची को बिना विभागीय जांच के बर्खास्त किया गया था। मुकदमे के निस्तारण में हुई देरी के लिए उसे उसके सेवानिवृत्ति परिलाभ से वंचित नहीं किया जा सकता।
सरकारी अधिवक्ता का प्रतिवाद
■ सरकार के अपर मुख्य स्थायी अधिवक्ता गिरिजेश त्रिपाठी ने प्रतिवाद करते हुए कहा, याची बाइज्जत बरी नहीं किया गया है। भले ही उसकी बर्खास्तगी विभागीय जांच के बिना हुई थी, लेकिन उसकी सेवा अस्थाई प्रकृति की थी। उसकी सेवा एक माह के नोटिस के साथ कभी भी समाप्त की जा सकती है। इसलिए वह अनुच्छेद 311 (2) के अंतर्गत सरकारी सेवक की परिभाषा में नहीं आता। ऐसे में न तो उसके खिलाफ विभागीय जांच की जरूरत है और न वह किसी भी प्रकार का सेवालाभ पाने का अधिकारी है।
WRIT – A No. – 6576 of 2023 at Allahabad : Netram Vs. State Of U.P. And 3 Others
Date of Decision – 11/3/2024
Court Number – 7
Judgment Type – Final AFR
Coram – Hon’ble J.J. Munir,J.
Petitioner’s Counsels – Darwari Lal
Respondent’s Counsel – C.S.C.
Hon’ble J.J. Munir,J.
1. The petitioner, a tubewell operator in the Tubewell Division of the Department of Irrigation, Government of Uttar Pradesh, last posted at Bareilly, seeks redemption of his lost service and its incidents, to wit, payment of his emoluments for the period that he was out of service, pension etc. The petitioner lost his service in consequence of conviction in a criminal case on charges of corruption by the Trial Court. Now that he has been acquitted in appeal by this Court, he says that he is entitled to the revocation of the order of his dismissal from service dated 28.12.1983 with consequential benefits.
2. The facts, giving rise to this writ petition, are:
The petitioner was appointed a tubewell operator in the Tubewell Division of the Department of Irrigation vide letter of appointment dated 17.08.1977 issued by the Executive Engineer, Tubewell Division, Bareilly. He was posted at Tubewell No.32, Fatehgang-West. He joined service on 01.09.1977. As the letter of appointment would show, the petitioner’s services were temporary and carried a condition that the employment could be determined by either side, giving a month’s notice. While working at Village Satuia Khass, falling within the local limits of Police Station Fatehganj-West, District Bareilly, the petitioner was accused of accepting a sum of Rs.30/- in illegal gratification from one Puran Lal Yaduvanshi on 15.12.1978. The illegal gratification was said to be accepted by the petitioner to favour Yaduvanshi in the matter of not making an irrigation entry for him in government record. A First Information Report was registered against the petitioner on 15.12.1978, giving rise to Crime No.159 of 1978, under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Police Station Fatehganj-West, District Bareilly. After investigation, the Police charge-sheeted the petitioner on 21.08.1979. The petitioner stood his trial on the aforesaid charge before the Additional District and Sessions Judge-VII, Bareilly, who convicted and sentenced him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.100/-.
3. The aforesaid information was conveyed to the Executive Engineer, Tubewell Division, U.P., Bareilly by the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Organization, C.I.D., U.P., Lucknow vide letter dated 16.11.1983. Acting on the said information, the Executive Engineer, Tubewell Division, Bareilly, vide his Order No. 46/83-84 dated 28.12.1983 dismissed the petitioner from service, consequent upon conviction. No departmental proceedings were initiated or held against the petitioner, where he was found guilty. The dismissal from service was based, according to the petitioner, on the judgment of conviction alone, passed by the Trial Judge.
4. It also appears, according to the prosecution case before the Criminal Court, that the petitioner was caught red-handed on 15.12.1978 accepting a bribe of Rs.30/-. He was immediately arrested. The petitioner was suspended from service by an order dated 18.12.1978. During the period of suspension, the petitioner was paid half his salary, including allowances as per standing orders of the State Government. This happened in the interregnum between the petitioner’s arrest and his conviction by the Criminal Court. What happened after the judgment of conviction was passed by the Trial Judge, has already been said and need not be repeated.
5. The petitioner challenged his conviction by the Trial Judge before this Court by preferring an appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 2187 of 1983. The appeal was heard and allowed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 01.02.2023 and the petitioner was acquitted. The acquittal, however, was one extending the benefit of doubt. Post acquittal, the petitioner lodged an application before the Executive Engineer, Tubewell Division, Bareilly and the Superintending Engineer, Tubewell Central, Lucknow, requesting that in accordance with Government Orders on the subject, the respondents may pay half salary to the petitioner between 15.12.1978 and 05.09.1983 and full salary from 05.09.1983 until the petitioner’s superannuation in the year 2016. He also requested that he may be sanctioned and paid his retirement pension. Representations to this effect were made on 24.02.2023 and 22.03.2023. No action was taken on any of these applications/ representations.
6. It is the petitioner’s case that he had never committed any offence, but was implicated falsely on account of someone’s grudge and ill will. Now that he has been acquitted, it is the petitioner’s case that he is entitled to his salary and pension. The inaction of the respondents to restore him to status and the incidents of it, despite acquittal by the Court of appeal, a status that was taken away upon conviction by the Trial Court, is an act on the respondents’ part that is illegal, arbitrary and unjust. On the foot of these facts and urging his case as aforesaid, the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition.
7. To the extent of the facts and events leading to the petitioner’s dismissal from service on account of his conviction in the criminal case on charges of corruption by the Trial Judge and his subsequent acquittal in appeal by this Court, the parties are ad idem.
8. A short counter affidavit has been filed by respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5, followed by a counter affidavit on behalf of all the respondents. The short counter affidavit does not say much on the issues raised and was necessitated because the petitioner’s records had gone untraceable. This affidavit was filed with the service records relating to the petitioner, which was until then untraceable. Later on, these were traced out and produced before the Court and duly perused. A counter affidavit was then filed on behalf of all the respondents, answering the petitioner’s case on the merits.
9. Apart from facts and issues noticed hereinbefore, where parties are not at conflict, it is averred in paragraph No.7 of the counter affidavit that the petitioner’s acquittal by this Court was not an honourable one, but extending the benefit of doubt. In paragraph No.8 of the counter affidavit, it is pleaded that the total period, during which the petitioner rendered service, was one year and three months. Whatever GPF is due, the same is being calculated and will be paid to the petitioner. It is emphasized that the petitioner having retired seven years prior to the judgment of acquittal dated 01.02.2023, there cannot be any reinstatement for him. It is emphasized that the petitioner has not done any official work from 15.12.1978 to 31.01.2016, the latter being the date of his superannuation. It is also pleaded that the respondents have no role in the criminal case launched against the petitioner. He is solely responsible for his conviction. It is averred that it is on account of the petitioner’s own misdeeds that he was arrested and subsequently convicted, which led to his dismissal from service. It has been pleaded that under such circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to salary or emoluments, as claimed by him in his representations to the District Magistrate.
10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner waived his opportunity to file a rejoinder, consequent upon which the petition was admitted to hearing and heard forthwith. Judgment was reserved.
11. Heard Mr. Darwari Lal, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
12. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner would be entitled to reinstatement in the event the judgment of acquittal had been passed before the date of his superannuation. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, this is so for reason that the petitioner’s dismissal from service vide order dated 28.12.1983, ordered by the Executive Engineer, was in consequence of the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Trial Judge in the criminal case. There were no disciplinary proceedings held against the petitioner, holding him guilty. Now that the petitioner has retired from service, the respondents are obliged to pay him salary for the entire period that he has remained out of service, the balance of his salary for the period that he suffered suspension pending trial, and also retirement pension, which is the logical incident of his status as an employee of the respondents, that must be deemed to have been restored to him upon his acquittal in the criminal case, on appeal by this Court.
13. On the other hand, Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that the petitioner has not been honourably acquitted, but granted the benefit of doubt. If the judgment had been rendered during the period of time that he was still on the right side of his age of superannuation, the respondents would have the option of instituting disciplinary proceedings against him on the same charges on which he was tried, and determining the worth of the charge by a different standard, that is applicable to disciplinary proceedings. The judgment of the Criminal Court would not foreclose that avenue for the respondents.
14. It is submitted in the alternative that even if the petitioner be entitled to reinstatement in service upon the judgment of acquittal passed by this Court in appeal, now that the petitioner has retired, it is not a case where he can be paid his emoluments for not rendering any work during the time period between the judgment of the Trial Court and this Court. For the same reason, since the petitioner has not rendered any work, ever since his suspension from service, way back in the year 1978 until the date of his superannuation in the year 2016, the petitioner would not be entitled to any retirement pension.
15. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the petitioner has been placed in circumstances where hardly any relief can be extended to him, though, may be, not for much fault of his. Learned Counsel for both parties have not brought to this Court’s notice the service rules applicable to the petitioner, governing a situation like the present one, to wit, where the employee is convicted in a criminal case. But, it is safe to assume that the service rules would follow what Article 311 provides, if they are to be regarded constitutionally valid. Article 311 the Constitution provides:
“311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.—(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:
Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply—
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.”
16. A perusal of Article 311 shows that the normal rule, governing the dismissal or removal of a member of a civil service of the Union or the civil service of a State, or one who is holding a civil post under the Union or a State, mandates that no such dismissal etc. can be ordered unless the employee concerned has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of hearing. This rule envisaged under Article 311 (2) makes it mandatory that before an order of dismissal etc. can be passed against the holder of a civil post under the State, departmental proceedings have to be convened, that involve holding of a departmental inquiry in accordance with procedure prescribed under the relevant rules applicable. Some salutary principles about the holding of such inquiry have also to be followed.
17. Clause (a) of the proviso to Article 311 (2), however, carves out an exception in a case where the employee is dismissed or removed etc. on ground of conduct, which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Therefore, while it was lawful for the respondents to have dismissed the petitioner from service upon his conviction by the Trial Judge on charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act, involving acceptance of illegal gratification, the order was passed not on the employer’s own opinion about the charges. It was merely a consequence of the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Judge in the criminal case.
18. Now that the petitioner has been acquitted in appeal, if indeed, he had not superannuated, the respondents would be obliged to reinstate him in service, may be without paying anything for the period of time that he was out of employment. They would still have the option, if they so elected, considering the case and the evidence appearing against the petitioner, to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him, holding an inquiry on the relative charge. If they could indeed have done so, can now only be a subject matter of speculation. In Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and another, (1996) 11 SCC 603, the facts would show that the petitioner was charged for an offence of murder punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The Sessions Judge convicted him and awarded life imprisonment. On the foot of this judgment, the petitioner, who was a Junior Clerk, employed with the Electricity Board, was dismissed from service. The petitioner challenged his dismissal from service by a writ petition before the High Court. While the writ petition was pending, in the appeal carried by the petitioner from the Trial Judge’s order, he was acquitted. The learned Single Judge, before whom the writ petition came up, taking into consideration the petitioner’s acquittal by the High Court in appeal, directed his reinstatement in service with continuity, but denied back wages. The petitioner’s Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench. It was in the context of of these facts that it was held by the Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra):
“3. The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference.”
19. In Union of India and others v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121, the employee was charged with murder and convicted by the Trial Judge for the said offence by his judgment and order dated 05.03.1997. On appeal, the Division Bench acquitted him. Despite the acquittal, the employee was not reinstated in service. He petitioned the High Court, which allowed the writ petition, granting reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits. On appeal by special leave by the Union of India from the judgment of the High Court, the order was modified to provide that the employee would be entitled to back wages from the date of acquittal, though the period for which the employee remained out of service, will be counted towards service without any break. The reinstatement was not disturbed. What was, therefore, denied by the Supreme Court were wages for the period that the employee remained out of service on account of the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court. In Jaipal Singh (supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court:
“4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefor does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon by the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically recorded therefor it operates as a binding precedent as well. On going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Ranchhodji [(1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 491] . If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial Court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside.”
20. In Raj Narain v. Union of India and others, (2019) 5 SCC 809, a much later decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the facts show that the employee was working as a Sorting Assistant in the Railway Mall Service at Mughalsarai. He was placed under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings on allegations of forgery, which led to payment of high-value money orders. A First Information Report was lodged against the employee. The order of suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987, in consequence of which he worked till 28.02.1997. However, upon conviction by the Trial Judge in the criminal case, he was dismissed from service on 28.02.1997. On appeal, the employee succeeded and a judgment of acquittal was passed in his favour. The appellant claimed reinstatement, which the employers refused. The order refusing reinstatement said that as he was dismissed from service more than six years ago, he could not be reinstated. The order declining reinstatement was challenged before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the Original Application and directed the employee’s reinstatement with benefit of seniority and notional fixation of pay together with increments from the date of his dismissal till reinstatement. The Tribunal, nevertheless, denied back wages for the period that the employee was not in service. The employee was reinstated in compliance with the Tribunal’s order. The employee’s claim for full emoluments during the period of suspension was also declined by the employers. The employee preferred a writ petition against the Tribunal’s judgment, by which he was denied back wages. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition, holding him entitled to full back wages from the date of his acquittal until his reinstatement. The employee then carried the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave to the extent that he was denied back wages for the period between his dismissal from service and the judgment of acquittal in his favour. Their Lordships considered both Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore and Jaipal Singh, and, explained the distinction between a criminal case initiated by the employers and one instituted by the Police, without the employers’ involvement and its impact on the claim for back wages in the event of acquittal.
21. In Raj Narain (supra) one feature that was noticed by the Court was the fact that departmental proceedings had been initiated in relation to conduct that had led to the criminal prosecution with the employee being placed under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings, but the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983, which was much before his conviction by the Criminal Court on 28.02.1997, when he was also dismissed from service. The employee was held entitled to backwages from the date of his acquittal as directed by the High Court and also full salary from the date of his suspension to the date of his reinstatement, because the disciplinary proceedings were dropped. However, back wages were not granted for the period that the employee remained out of employment on account of the order of dismissal following conviction by the Trial Judge.
22. In Raj Narain, considering the various facts and how the law would bear upon it, it was held:
“5. This Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore [Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 491] considered the case of an employee who sought back wages for the period he was kept out of duty during the pendency of a criminal case for his involvement in an offence under Section 302 IPC. The claim of the petitioner therein was that he was entitled to full wages on his acquittal by the criminal court. This Court rejected the said submission by holding that the question of payment of back wages would arise only in case of termination of service, pursuant to findings recorded in a departmental enquiry. In the event of the dismissal order being set aside by the Court, the delinquent employee would be entitled to claim back wages as he was unlawfully kept away from duty by the employer. This Court was of the opinion that an employee against whom criminal proceedings are initiated would stand on a different footing in comparison to an employee facing a departmental enquiry. The employee involved in a crime has disabled himself from rendering his services on account of his incarceration in jail. Subsequent acquittal by an appellate court would not entitle him to claim back wages.
6. The decision of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore [Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 491] was followed by this Court in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh [Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 12] to refuse back wages to an employee who was initially convicted for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and later acquitted by the High Court in a criminal appeal. While refusing to grant relief to the petitioner therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal would not entitle an employee to seek back wages. However, this Court was of the opinion that if the prosecution is launched at the behest of the department and the employee is acquitted, different considerations may arise. The learned counsel for the appellant endeavoured to distinguish the prosecution launched by the police for involvement of an employee in a criminal case and the criminal proceedings initiated at the behest of the employer. The observation made in the judgment in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh [Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 12] has to be understood in a manner in which the department would become liable for back wages in the event of a finding that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala fide or with vexatious intent. In all other cases, we do not see any difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings by the department vis-à-vis a criminal case lodged by the police. For example, if an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious.
7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The appellant was placed under suspension on 23-10-1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21-10-1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21-3-1983. It is clear from the record that the appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental enquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental enquiry. Thereafter, the respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23-10-1979 came to an end on 21-3-1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21-10-1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the IA, we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the appellant is entitled for full wages from 23-10-1979 to 21-10-1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.”
23. This is a case where no departmental proceedings were ever initiated and the dismissal order was founded entirely on the judgment of the Criminal Court. We have remarked earlier that if the judgment of acquittal in appeal had come before the petitioner’s superannuation, he would surely be entitled to reinstatement from the date of the judgment in appeal. He would then also be entitled to continuity of service, though not for the back wages before the date of the judgment of acquittal.
24. The facts here are hard and we do not want to succumb to the temptation of doing a fact-based justice, departing from principle. It is indeed hard for the petitioner that the judgment of acquittal came too late. If it had come in time, not only the petitioner would be entitled to reinstatement, but reckoning his continuity of service, also to his pension. That cannot be done in this case, because the petitioner can no more be reinstated in service. If that cannot be done, no other consequence can attach. This is a case where the petitioner has hardly worked for a year and three months in a temporary capacity, or as the respondents say, on probation, though we did not find any letter showing the petitioner to be an appointee on probation. The letter of appointment shows him to be a temporary employee.
25. Be that as it may, since the petitioner was never reinstated in service and never worked, except the one year and three months before the fateful day, when he was caught accepting a bribe, a charge of which he has been later on acquitted in appeal, in the considered opinion of this Court, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. It is said that hard facts make bad law, but we think that this should not be permitted to happen.
26. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed.
27. Costs easy.
Order Date :- 11.03.2024